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The dearth of legal literature concerning appellate court eth-
ics has prompted Justice Seidenfeld to examine the present
state of appellate representation. He finds the quality of repre-
sentation generally satisfactory, but flawed by too many exam-
ples of attorney incompetence. To improve the overall quality
to an acceptable level, Justice Seidenfeld suggests a three-
pronged approach: the creation of new ethical standards ad-
dressed to the unique problems of appellate representation, con-
tinued court compensation for errors potentially harmful to the
client, and increased court authority to impose varying degrees
of disciplinary sanctions.
INTRODUCTION
A basic tenet of professional responsibility in all courts is to
perform independent professional services with integrity and
competence.' Unfortunately, standards of performance appropri-
ate to advocacy are too often unobserved by some attorneys prac-
ticing before appellate courts. While this relatively small percen-
tage of lawyers seldom engage in the types of misconduct which
warrant severe disciplinary action, they unquestionably fail to
fulfill their responsibilities to their clients and the judicial sys-
tem. Consequently, these attorneys seriously damage the
effectiveness of reviewing courts. This should be neither over-
looked nor tolerated.
Cause for this serious problem rests partially upon the absence
of adequate standards to guide the attorney through the distinc-
tive functions comprising the appellate process. General ethical
standards for appellate counsel are in broad scope identical with
those imposed upon trial attorneys. However, intermediate ap-
pellate courts and courts of last resort have obvious differences
in function and demand from those of trial courts. Different pro-
* Justice, Illinois Appellate Court, Second District. J.D., University of Michigan Law
School.
1. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1 (1969).
APPELLATE ETHICS
fessional qualifications are therefore required in terms of knowl-
edge, procedure, scholarship, and argument. Only those qualifi-
cations pertaining to trial attorneys have been sufficiently ad-
dressed.
The fundamental ethical principles which are to guide all law-
yers have been stated in codes of professional responsibility,2 con-
taining canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary rules.
Certain canons appear to have a more particular bearing upon the
responsibilities of a lawyer in litigation. These deal with the ad-
versary system and state the duty to represent a client compe-
tently,3 and zealously within the bounds of the law,4 and to main-
tain the integrity and competence of the legal profession.5 The
general concepts contained in the ethical considerations and dis-
ciplinary rules derived from these canons are also applicable to
all courts.' Unfortunately, these general concepts have never been
2. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility (1969); Illinois State Bar Association, Illi-
nois Code of Professional Responsibility (1970). The Illinois Code has followed the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility with only minor changes. Unless otherwise indicated,
any citations made to the canons, ethical considerations, or disciplinary rules of the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility also refer to the corresponding sections in the Illinois
Code of Professional Responsibility.
The canons are "statements of axiomatic norms," expressing general concepts from
which the ethical considerations and the disciplinary rules are derived; the ethical consid-
erations are "aspirational" and represent the objectives for which members of the profes-
sion should strive; and the disciplinary rules state the minimum level of conduct below
which there is cause for disciplinary action. See, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
Preliminary Statement (1969). The canons adopted by the various bar associations are
applicable to members and nonmembers alike. See People v. Gilmore, 345 Ill. 28, 45-46,
177 N.E. 710, 717 (1931).
3. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6 (1969).
4. Id. Canon 7.
5. Id. Canon 1. Duties imposed by the remaining canons, including the duty to assist
in the improvement of the legal profession, id. Canon 8, may also apply in given litigation
situations since there is "no organized inter-relationship of the Canons and they often
overlap." Id. at Preface.
6. Id. Canon 7, Ethical Consideration 7-19, Ethical Consideration 7-39, Disciplinary
Rule 7-101, Disciplinary Rule 7-102; id. Canon 6, Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A),(1),(2),(3).
Furthermore, according to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility the lawyer must:
become and remain proficient in his practice, Ethical Consideration 6-1; concentrate in
particular areas of the law, Ethical Consideration 6-2; refuse to accept employment in any
area of the law in which he is not competent unless he expects to become qualified by
diligent study, Ethical Consideration 6-3; with the consent of his client, engage a compe-
tent lawyer who is qualified to associate with him, Ethical Consideration 6-4. The Ethical
Consideration that "[a] lawyer should have pride in his professional endeavors and that
his obligation to act competently calls for higher motivation than that arising from fear
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applied to specific problems of appellate advocacy. Moreover, the
specific language contained in the ethical considerations and dis-
ciplinary rules is couched primarily in terms relating to trial prac-
tice. Therefore, it is seriously questionable whether the Code of
Professional Responsibility contains adequate direction to law-
yers participating in litigation at the reviewing court level.7
Attorney incompetence engendered by the absence of specific
standards is aggravated because the client in an appellate pro-
ceeding is often unable to adequately protect his own interests.
He is less able to observe and identify inadequate performance in
the appellate court than he is in the trial court, where his partici-
pation in the litigation process is much more direct.
Court opinions, another possible source of guidance, also have
not sufficiently delineated the standards of appellate ethics.
There appear to be comparatively few reported cases which refer
to a lawyer's appellate responsibilities.' This may imply that the
of civil liability or disciplinary penalty," Ethical Consideration 6-5, is, of course, applica-
ble to both trial and appellate practice. The Ethical Considerations derived from Canon
7, which offer guidelines to the lawyer attempting to represent his client within the bounds
of the law, are in their general terms applicable to both trial and appellate practice since
it is true in each that "[tihe professional responsibility of a lawyer derives from his
membership in a profession which has the duty of assisting members of the public to
secure and protect available legal rights and benefits." Canon 7, Ethical Consideration
7-1.
7. An inquiry into the body of informal decisions or opinions rendered by the American
Bar Association in connection with the canons and rules reveals that a totally inconse-
quential fraction of them deal with appellate advocacy. On inquiry only two were found:
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Decisions C689, (1963) (filing notice of
appeal prior to time record could be examined for grounds held not to violate then Canon
30 barring harassment; negotiating for settlement subsequent to filing of notice of appeal
held proper); and ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Opinion, No. 955 (1967)
(right of lawyer to file Anders motion to withdraw after noting that appeal is frivolous,
see Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)).
8. But see Matherne v. United States, 391 F.2d 449, 450 (5th Cir. 1968), in which a
breach of professional responsibility was reported. The court noted the frequency of such
problems on the appellate level.
The Illinois Supreme Court has manifested its own concern in the area of professional
responsibility by establishing the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of
the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1973. See note 87 infra. While no firm statistics were
available categorizing the nature and source of the complaints, the Administrator of the
Commission, Carl Rolewick, ina recent telephone conversation, estimated that of the
several thousand complaints already received by the Commission, approximately 1-2
percent had come from prison inmates. The majority of the inmates complained of the
time their appeal had taken, of the advice given by the public defender or appellate
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problem is not of serious dimension. It also may be, however, that
either insufficient attention has been paid to appellate ethics, or,
since the nature of appellate procedure generally precludes
clients from discovering incompetent attorneys, client complaints
are seldom registered.
The establishment of specific standards of appellate responsi-
bility will undoubtedly improve professional competence by pro-
viding guidelines to appellate conduct. However, a reviewing
court must still remain prepared to effectively counter attorney
misconduct or incompetence.' Imposed upon appellate courts is
the responsibility to compensate for the errors of counsel and to
discipline violators of professional ethics. Attorneys as well as
judges must fully understand their respective responsibilities if
the overall quality of appellate representation is to be improved.
With those aims in mind, several specific recommendations will
be offered.
ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY TO BOTH CLIENT AND COURT
While careful attention by the attorney to rules governing ap-
peals will enable him to efficiently pursue an appeal, the rules
provide him insufficient guidelines in matters of competency and
ethics. The following proposals are suggested ethical considera-
tions for appellate attorneys in need of specific guidelines.
The proposals offered here are addressed to the prevention of
certain types of appellate conduct which have either been re-
ported in cases or been otherwise observed by reviewing courts.
With nearly each type of conduct, both court and client are
defender that they had no grounds for appeal, and of the incompetence of their appointed
defender. Mr. Rolewick estimated that 60 percent of all the complaints resulted from a
lack of effective communication between counsel and client. Oftentimes, the complaining
client simply felt that his attorney was not sufficiently apprising him of the status of the
case. The other 40 percent of the complaints were primarily comprised of the following
matters: fee disputes, failure to commence legal action subsequent to retainer payment,
failure to pursue legal action to conclusion, and allegations of conflict of interest.
9. For purpose of this Article, the terms misconduct and incompetence are distinguish-
able. Misconduct refers to the type of unethical behavior which warrants severe discipli-
nary sanctions, including censure, suspension, disbarment, or a civil malpractice suit.
Incompetence is less serious. That type of behavior satisfies the minimum standards below
which lies cause for severe disciplinary action, but falls short of the quality of representa-
tion which the court system and the public have a right to expect.
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harmed. The client is unnecessarily placed in jeopardy of losing
his case. Moreover, the court is denied the adequate presentation
necessary to insure that issues are fully and fairly articulated so
that the appropriate decision may be reached and the already
overextended judicial facilities not be imposed upon. Included
after each proposal are examples of the types of conduct which
entered into the determination that the respective guideline is a
necessary facet of ethical appellate behavior.
It should be noted that not all the cases cited in this Article
represent examples of attorney incompetency. Appellate conduct
which may appear to be caused by neglect or error may have
actually involved unsettled procedural guidelines, the posture of
the appeal due to the prior actions of trial counsel, or the execu-
tion of trial strategy. The citations are often merely illustrations
of the areas in which professional incompetency may occasionally
be found.
PROPOSED ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. An attorney should not pursue an appeal if he finds
that the objectives are frivolous, without merit, or other-
wise improper. Similarly where this appeal is not in the
best interests of his client the lawyer is bound to clearly
advise the client of these views and the basis for them
before proceeding.
Of course, there are limits upon the appellate lawyer's duty to
"represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."' In
fact, it is improper for an attorney to prosecute an appeal which
has no proper appellate objective," or where the contentions
made by a client are clearly frivolous." This rule applies even
where appellant is a criminal defendant, regardless of whether
counsel is retained or appointed.'" The United States Supreme
10. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7.
11. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal.2d 777, 796 n.8, 336 P.2d 937, 951 n.8 (1959). However,
the court indicated that as long as private counsel complied with procedural rules, he
could brief and argue an appeal which wastes the time and money of the defendant, the
court, and the people. It is doubtful that more recent authorities would approve the scope
of this language.
12. Lee v. State, 204 So.2d 245, 249 (Fla. App. 1967).
13. Wood v. United States, 357 F.2d 425, 428 (10th Cir. 1966), quoting ABA Canons of
[Vol. 25:264
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Court has outlined the constitutionally mandated procedures for
an appellate counsel convinced that an indigent client's criminal
case is meritless.'4 Counsel must apprise the court of his evalua-
tion and request permission to withdraw. The request must be
accompanied by a brief which outlines "anything in the record
that might arguably support the appeal."'" In an Informal Opin-
ion, 6 the American Bar Association stated that the same proce-
dure should also apply in civil cases.
Attorneys have been subjected to disciplinary sanctions for
advancing meritless appeals. In one case, an attorney who did not
honestly believe in the merit of his appeal was found guilty of
misconduct for filing the brief." In another case, In re Bithoney,'"
an attorney had filed nine petitions for review in immigration
cases, some of which were not diligently pursued and none of
which raised any substantial issues. The federal appellate court
found that this attorney had engaged in inappropriate behavior.
In reaching its decision, the court also took into consideration the
fact that the filing of the petitions resulted in automatic stays of
deportation.
2. He is obliged to first determine the nature of the
judgment appealed and to prepare a notice of appeal
which will give the reviewing court jurisdiction.
Examples of counsel's failure to pursue a client's appeals with
diligence and dispatch can be documented at this early stage of
appellate litigation. A litigant may be deprived of his right to
appeal on the merits when an attorney fails to recognize a final
order of the trial court, and subsequently to appeal from it within
Professional Ethics, Canon 5 (1908) (superceded by ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity (1969)) stated:
An attorney is bound by all fair and honorable means to present every defense
that the law of the land permits to the end that no person may be deprived of
life or liberty but by due process of law. This does not require an attorney,
whether retained or appointed, to stultify himself by advancing arguments on
appeal which are known by him to be without merit.
14. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
15. Id. at 744.
16. ABA Standing Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Opinion, No. 955 (1967).
17. Tovar v. State, 39 Ariz. 528, 8 P.2d 247 (1932). See also Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F.
Supp. 670, 674-78 (D. Utah 1966), aff'd 386 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1967).
18. 486 F.2d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1973). See also text accompanying note 86 infra.
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the statutory time limit.'" Once the time limit has elapsed, the
earlier issues will have become res adjudicata and no longer sub-
ject to appellate review."0 Attorneys have also failed to file the
notice of appeal necessary to give jurisdiction to the appellate
court.2" Counsel's inattention in these situations places the
client's case in jeopardy, if not totally depriving him of his right
to appeal.
3. In cases which require greater urgency because of
their emergency nature or where the normal delay in the
process will render the issues moot, the appellate lawyer
has the duty to move the court to expedite the appeal
process whenever practicable.
An attorney should move to expedite an appeal when normal
delay before a final adjudication would create a risk of harm to
one of the parties or any other person who would be affected by
the decision.2" The responsibility to mitigate harm created by
normal appellate delay should be exercised in the following situa-
tions: child custody cases, other domestic relations cases, crimi-
nal cases in which the defendant is serving a relatively short
sentence, and cases where the age or illness of one or more of the
parties dictates an expedited decision. Of course, interlocutory
appeals should be resolved as quickly as possible to reduce delay
in the trial court.
4. In all appeals the lawyer has the duty to proceed
expeditiously and to request extensions of time to comply
with procedural rules only for conscientious reasons.
Failure of counsel to prosecute an appeal within time limita-
19. See People v. Mulgrew, 19 Ill.App.2d 327, 311 N.E.2d 378 (2d Dist. 1974).
20. Weber v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 10 Ill.App.3d 625, 632, 295 N.E.2d 41, 45 (1st Dist.
1973); In re Estate of Ireland, 132 Ill.App.2d 157, 160, 267 N.E.2d 681, 683-84 (2d Dist.
1971).
21. See People v. Burns, 164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968).
22. The appellate court also has the responsibility to try to expedite the appeal process
when a case requires greater urgency. This responsibility may involve sustaining counsel's
motion to expedite or, when counsel has neglected to make the motion, initiating the
action on its own. To effectively counter attorney neglect in this area, the appellate court
should adopt operating procedures which will enable the court to identify these types of
cases as early in the appellate process as possible.
[Vol. 25:264
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tions is possibly one of the most common breaches of professional
responsibility. A striking example is in People v. Aliwoli,23 in
which an attorney obtained three extensions to file a brief and
abstract, thereby delaying the appeal process for over a year. The
court had designated each extension "final." After the third ex-
tension had elapsed, the attorney did not ask for further exten-
sions, took no further action, nor explained these actions for the
record.
Failure to file a brief in the appellate court is one of the most
serious examples of improper appellate conduct directly affecting
the client's interest. When a state's attorney fails to file a brief,
it results in the denial of representation to the people.24 Such
misconduct places the court in the uncomfortable position of
being both judge and advocate, since the injured party is left, in
effect, without counsel in an essentially adversary proceeding.
This unfortunate practice may even result in a pro forma disposi-
tion. 5 Courts have noted that such misconduct simply cannot be
condoned."6
An attorney may subject himself to disciplinary action if he has
23. 60 Ill.2d 579, 328 N.E.2d 555 (1975). The court noted that the defendant was sen-
tenced on Oct. 14, 1971, a notice of appeal was filed on Oct. 27, 1971, and the record was
filed on Aug. 7, 1972. The attorney obtained extensions on Sept. 27, Nov. 15 and Dec. 27,
1972, all designated as "final" extensions. There was no further action and the appeal was
dismissed on the appellate court's own motion on April 11, 1973. On July 2, 1974 the state
appellate defender, who had succeeded the attorney, moved to reinstate the appeal alleg-
ing that the dismissal had not been brought to the defendant's attention. The appellate
court denied the motion to reinstate and the supreme court reversed, one justice dissent-
ing. Cf. People v. Brown, 39 Ill.2d 307, 235 N.E.2d 562 (1968).
24. People v. Bryant, 27 Ill.App.3d 288, 327 N.E.2d 186 (5th Dist. 1975).
25. In re Estate of Lehr, 28 Ill.App.3d 472, 474-75, 328 N.E.2d 654, 655-56 (5th Dist.
1975).
26. Id. See also Christensen v. Christensen, 31 Ill.App.3d 1041, 1042 n.1, 335 N.E.2d
581, 582 n.1 (2d Dist. 1975). The court stated:
Following the filing of the notice of appeal the defendant moved in this court to
stay the judgment pending appeal which we ordered taken with the case and
on our motion advanced the cause for an early hearing upon a short briefing
schedule. The defendant's brief was filed when due. The attorney for the plain-
tiff appeared on the date set for oral argument without having filed a brief and
was denied permission to argue. We express strong disapproval of counsel's
failure to file a brief for which no adequate explanation was offered.
However, pro forma dispositions from failure to file a brief not only result from counsel's
negligent behavior, but also from the client's failure to initially hire an attorney to pursue
the appeal.
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accepted the responsibility of perfecting an appeal and he is not
in a position to do so.27 An attorney insufficiently financed cannot
properly accept this responsibility. Moreover, an attorney of re-
cord should timely move to withdraw from a case when his client
is unwilling to pay for preparing and/or filing the brief.
5. An attorney is obligated to take all steps necessary
to insure that a proper record is prepared and that all trial
court exhibits necessary to the appeal are included.
Failure by appellate counsel to prepare a proper record has
resulted in both harm to the client and disciplinary action against
the attorney. In People v. Smith28 an attorney failed to file a
record in a timely fashion after giving notice of appeal. After
ordering the record, he did not pay for the preparation of the
transcripts. The result was that his client's appeal was jeopard-
ized and delayed for well over a year. In Matherne v. United
States29 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an official repri-
mand to an attorney who had failed to secure transcripts in a
timely fashion, to prosecute an appeal in forma pauperis, to re-
spond to an appellate court notice, and to file a timely brief. The
court found the attorney guilty of gross negligence, want of dili-
gence and in breach of his duty to both court and client.
An appellate attorney must also file all necessary trial court
exhibits. In Illinois, an attorney is required to include in the
record presented to the appellate court all the evidence pertinent
to the issues on appeal.3 ° When counsel fails to include exhibits
which are necessary for an understanding of the trial court's pro-
ceedings, the appeal may be dismissed.3"
6. The court rules which permit the most economical
procedure for abstracting or excerpting from the record
shall be followed to the extent that it is within the best
interests of the client. The attorney should attempt to
agree with adversary counsel to abridge the record so that
27. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 2, Ethical Consideration 2-30.
28. 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970).
29. 391 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1968).
30. ILl. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §323(a) (1973).
31. Heritage Shelter Care Home, Inc. v. Miller, 31 IlI.App.3d 700, 703-04, 334 N.E.2d
355, 358 (5th Dist. 1975).
[Vol. 25:264
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it will not include portions unnecessary for the appeal
which increase the costs and difficulty of the appellate
litigation. Where a court reporter transcript is not avail-
able he has the duty to avail his client of any substitute
method of presenting the record provided by court rules or
case law.
An attorney must file all necessary abstracts or excerpts from
the record. Once filed, the abstracts or excerpts must be concise,
complete, and objective. Failure to file required abstracts or ex-
cerpts from the record could result in a dismissal of the appeal
for which counsel will be held responsible.2 Moreover, failure to
abstract or excerpt a relevant portion of the record may preclude
predicating error upon that point when raised in the arguments.33
An abstract italicizing only testimony favorable to the defen-
dant and flatly misrepresenting the record so that it is misleading
will not be tolerated by the courts. 4 Further, an abstract which
is substantially a verbatim copy of the entire record is unaccepta-
ble if the record is large,35 or confused and incomplete. 6
In cases where the record does not contain a report of the pro-
ceedings, counsel should file the alternative, a stipulation or a
"bystander's report. '3 Failure to take advantage of this alterna-
tive may seriously harm a client's case.
38
7. Where procedure exists to limit the issues of appeal
by a conference in the reviewing court, the lawyer should
avail himself of this rule whenever practical in the inter-
ests of efficiency and economy.
In Illinois, Supreme Court Rule 310 provides for a prehearing
32. See, e.g., Frederick Chusid & Co. v. Collins Tuttle & Co., 10 Ill.App.3d 818, 822,
295 N.E.2d 74, 77 (1st Dist. 1973).
33. Dempski v. Dempski, 27 Ill.2d 69, 77, 187 N.E.2d 734, 738 (1965); Zechman v.
Zechman, 391 Ill. 510, 522, 63 N.E.2d 499, 504-05 (1945); Turner v. Boston, 10 IlI.App.3d
453, 454-55, 294 N.E.2d 102, 103 (5th Dist. 1973).
34. Miezio v. Miezio, 6 Ill.2d 469, 474, 129 N.E.2d 20, 22 (1955).
35. Meiners v. Moyer, 119 Ill.App.2d 94, 102, 255 N.E.2d 201, 204 (2d Dist. 1970).
36. People v. Sherwin, 361 11. 403, 404-05, 198 N.E. 343, 344 (1935); Flemming v. Burks,
63 IlI.App.2d 300, 303, 211 N.E.2d 546, 547-48 (1st Dist. 1965).
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §323(c) (1973). See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487,
495 (1963).
38. See People v. Hopping, 60 Ill.2d 246, 252-53, 326 N.E.2d 395, 399 (1975).
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conference "to consider the simplification of the issues and any
other matters that may aid in the disposition of the appeal."39
However, the conference can only be initiated at the request of
one of the parties. Since the inception of the rule in 1971, pretrial
conferences have been seldom requested. If reviewing courts were
provided the discretion to initiate the conference, more pretrial
conferences would be held to limit the issues before the court.
Perhaps more appeals would then be disposed of, or at least expe-
dited.'"
8. The appellate lawyer is confined to the record made
in the trial court and is obligated to make the most of the
record in presenting the appeal. He has the duty, however,
to plead his case in brief and argument only within the
confines of the record.
Problems also occur when an attorney's statement of facts is
replete with arguments or contains factual assertions without
appropriate reference to the abstract or record." Counsel may
also fail in his responsibilities by raising issues in an untimely
manner. If an issue is not raised in the original brief but argued
for the first time in the reply brief or in a petition for rehearing it
is ordinarily considered waived.4" Similarly, an attorney cannot
rely upon grounds for relief inconsistent with or in addition to
those advanced in the trial court. Such grounds are also generally
waived .
9. The lawyer has a duty to state facts fairly, concisely
and completely. All assignment of error should be fairly
39. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 310 (1973).
40. Positive results from pre-hearing conferences in appellate court were obtained in the
New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department. In an attempt to
reduce its large backlog of appeals set for oral argument, the court imposed a pre-
argument conference on all such cases.
During a four-month period beginning December 1, 1974, settlements were reached in
almost 50% of the civil appeals after pre-argument conference. In another 34% of the civil
appeals, the attorneys agreed to limit the issues and facts in dispute. The Brief, vol.3,
no.4, at 3 (May,1975) (Newsletter of the Appellate Lawyers Association).
41. Harper v. Kennedy, 15 1ll.2d 46, 55, 153 N.E.2d 801, 805-06 (1958).
42. li.. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §341(e)(7) (1973). See, e.g., O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Feddeler,
16 Ill.App.3d 35, 38-39, 305 N.E.2d 325, 327-28 (1st Dist. 1975).
43. Transport Ins. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 6 Ill.App.3d 844, 847, 286 N.E.2d 755,
757 (1st Dist. 1972).
[Vol. 25:264
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supported and frivolous and immaterial issues carefully
avoided.
"It is a minimal requirement to insist that counsel, out of their
duty to the court, shall not deliberately make misstatements of
fact."" In his dealings with the appellate court, an attorney
should always make full disclosures and never seek to mislead it
into unnecessary action through artifice or concealment.45 The
court is entitled to a fair statement of the facts on both sides, not
an exaggerated self-serving version or a version omitting material
facts." In an abstract, for instance, an attorney might include
only the parts of the evidence favorable to his party's contention
and then base his argument upon that misstatement. Clearly,
this is grossly improper practice.47
In Quality Molding Co. v. American National Fire Insurance
Co.," plaintiff's attorney supported his argument with a misquo-
tation from a case. Without indication, he eliminated nineteen
words from the quotation, affecting its meaning. While the appel-
late court found his conduct careless but inadvertant, it indicated
that a deliberate misquotation would require strong condemna-
tion.49 Undoubtedly, such misconduct ultimately injures the
44. Davis v. Davis, 131 Ill.App.2d 459, 461, 268 N.E.2d 491, 493 (1st Dist. 1971).
45. State v. Weinstein, 411 S.W.2d 267, 274 (Mo. App. 1967). See also In re Schildhaus,
23 App.Div.2d 152, 259 N.Y.S. 2d 631, 634 (Sup. Ct. 1965). There is an increasing tendency
of reviewing courts to waive the filing of abstracts or excerpts from the record. This makes
it even more imperative that the statement of facts in the briefs be complete and accurate,
particularly since there is a single record available to a multiple-judge court.
46. Yarc v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 17 Ill.App.3d 667, 669, 309 N.E.2d 749, 751
(2d Dist. 1974); Cooper v. State, 309 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1974).
Omission of material facts is particularly common in motions regarding bail. A serious
omission in a defense attorney's motion for either bail or a reduction in bail will cause
the motion to be overruled for failure to show good cause since the court cannot base a
decision upon insufficient information. Prosecutors are also guilty of omitting material
facts in bail proceedings. They fail to respond to defense attorneys' motions with suffi-
ciently detailed objections, which results in the judge sustaining an often unjustifiable
defense motion. In either instance, the party represented is at a disadvantage. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §609(b) (1973).
47. Zechman v. Zechman, 391 11. 510, 521, 63 N.E.2d 499, 504 (1945).
48. 287 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1961).
49. Id. at 316. However, the court warned:
Attorneys whose names are affixed to briefs filed in this court have a heavy
responsibility to see to it that quotations from the opinions of other courts as
well as other statements therein are completely accurate.
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client, since the court can then no longer rely upon his attorney's
statements.'
An appellate attorney must also avoid supplementing the re-
cord with unsupported factual statements or inferences. In In re
Greenberg5 the respondent's brief represented as fact matters
which were at best inferences. The court indicated that although
an attorney may draw arguable inferences from the facts of the
case, he cannot present them as if they were the facts them-
selves.5"
10. In his brief, an attorney must display competence
in appellate advocacy techniques. He must provide the
court clearly defined issues, persuasive argument, and
citations to all pertinent authorities.
"Reviewing courts are entitled to have the issues clearly de-
fined, [and] to be cited pertinent authorities."53 In particular,
when a novel question is presented to the court it should not be
forced to make an independent search of authorities. 4 When an
attorney fails to pursue a contention through arguments or cita-
tion, there is the danger, particularly when reviewing courts are
overburdened, that unfortunate precedents may result.55 In pre-
50. Cooper v. State, 309 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. 1974).
51. 15 N.J. 132, 104 A.2d 46 (1954).
52. Id. at 138, 104 A.2d at 49. The court stated:
[Tihe case should serve as a warning to all that the bar is expected to live up
in full measure to its professional obligations in the delicate and difficult process
of molding the law of the state insofar as it is embodied in the decisions of the
appellate courts to the needs of the time.
53. In re Estate of Kunz, 7 Ill.App.3d 760, 763, 288 N.E.2d 520, 523 (5th Dist. 1972).
54. Kelley v. Kelley, 317 Il1. 104, 147 N.E. 659 (1925).
55. See id. at 107, 147 N.E. at 660. The Illinois Supreme Court commented:
The questions presented by this appeal are novel and a decision of them is
bound to be far-reaching. Notwithstanding this, we have been compelled to
make an independent search of the authorities and have not been aided by
properly prepared briefs of counsel. Appellant has filed a brief citing an early
case decided by this court where the only question involved was the modification
of a decree in personam entered at a former term of court. The brief has not
furnished us with any of the authorities from other jurisdictions which deal with
the questions before us. . . . If the questions involved in a case are of sufficient
importance to justify asking this court to decide them, they are worthy of the
careful consideration of counsel presenting them. If the case is not properly
presented and the court is not given the benefit of precedents there is danger of
a decision being rendered that will not be in harmony with the weight of author-
ity.
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senting his argument, counsel is ethically required to disclose
any adverse court decisions. However, such decisions may be dis-
tinguished or challenged." A reviewing court may, under certain
circumstances, justifiably disregard unsubstantiated contentions
on the grounds they were not conscientiously presented."
Appellate courts do not hesitate to point out an attorney's poor
presentation. In Dortch v. Lugar" the Supreme Court of Indiana
felt obligated to comment upon the poor quality of the briefs
presented for its consideration. It asserted that counsel's appel-
late duties extend beyond advancing mere assertions, thereby
leaving the court with the responsibility of finding the issues and
applicable law.5" Similarly in Frances v. State" the Indiana high
court criticized the quality of appellant's brief, noting that it
lacked cogent argument and citation. The court stated that
"[m]eager pro forma compliance with rules of appellate practice
represents less than desired performance from appellate coun-
sel." 6' It ordered the attorney to rebrief the cause.
11. When it will aid the proper presentation of the
issues on appeal oral argument should be requested and
carefully prepared. Statements which are not supported
In In re Estate of Kunz, 7 Ill.App.3d 760, 762, 288 N.E.2d 520, 523 (5th Dist. 1972), the
Illinois appellate court noted that the restatement of the rule was "long overdue."
56. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 7, Ethical Consideration 7-23;
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 146 (1935). It is interesting to note that
Ethical Consideration 7-23 of the Illinois State Bar Association, Illinois Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, Canon 7 omits the following language of the ABA version of Ethical
Consideration 7-23:
Where a lawyer knows of legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction directly
adverse to the position of his client, he should inform the tribunal of its existence
unless his adversary has done so; but, having made such disclosure, he may
challenge its soundness in whole or in part.
If the omission is not inadvertant, it would appear that the Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility steps back from a proper aspirational approach to professional ethics.
57. Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc., 10 Ill.App.3d 276, 282, 293 N.E.2d 483, 487 (2d Dist. 1973).
58. 255 Ind. 545, 266 N.E.2d 25 (1971).
59. Id. at 588, 266 N.E.2d at 51. The court commented:
Certainly the obligation of an appellate attorney goes beyond the making of bare
assertions, leaving the court to its own devices to ascertain the precise nature
of the contentions made and the law, if any, applicable thereto. We have,
throughout our consideration of this appeal, indulged in a great deal of patience
which we neither consider required on our part nor guaranteed for the future.




by the record or the law must be avoided. Issues in the
brief which are material should not be waived in oral argu-
ment nor material points unnecessarily conceded.
Ordinarily, counsel has no duty to the reviewing court or his
client to present oral argument unless the court so orders or his
client insists."2 However, while appellate judges disagree as to
whether oral argument is useful in every case, an attorney's fail-
ure to request oral argument may, under certain circumstances,
amount to a failure to represent his client competently. 3 It may
also deprive the court of valuable assistance in arriving at a deci-
sion.
Oral argument should be requested whenever the written brief
proves insufficient for a proper and effective presentation of the
case. The brief may be insufficient for many reasons: issues may
not be fully developed; dispositive arguments may not be empha-
sized; controlling authorities may be omitted inadvertently or
because they were decided after preparation of the brief; opposing
party briefs may raise conflicting claims as to the content of the
record; or the importance, complexity, or novelty of the case may
require further or different emphasis or a more concise treatment
than was presented in the written brief. Professor Karl Llewellyn
succinctly described the importance of oral argument. "In oral
argument lies counsel's hedge against misdiagnosis and
misperformance in the brief, the one last chance of locating a
postern missed in the advance survey." 4 The ethical considera-
tion that a lawyer have pride in his professional endeavors" and
the disciplinary rule that requires adequate preparation and for-
bids neglect in legal matters6 bear upon the question of whether
to present oral argument in a particular case.
Once oral argument is scheduled, it becomes a matter of profes-
sional competence for the attorney to discern the differences in
the function of oral argument before intermediate appellate
62. See ILL.REv.STAT. ch. 110A, §352 (g) (1973).
63. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Ethical Consideration 6-4.
64. Quoted in Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend in Court, 60 A.B.A.J. 175, 176
(1974) (Judge Kaufman serves on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit).
65. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Ethical Consideration 6-5.
66. Id. Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2),(3).
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courts and courts of final review.7 Arguments presented before
final reviewing courts should address broad policy considerations;
in contrast, arguments before intermediate courts should stress
relevant precedent.
12. Criticism of appellate court action directed at im-
provement of the legal system may be warranted. How-
ever, it must be expressed in respectful terms and any
remedial action pursued through legitimate channels.
Lawyers have a duty to assist in maintaining the integrity and
competence of the legal system. 8 This duty to respect courts is
not imposed for the sake of the temporary incumbent judicial
officer, but for the maintenance of proper respect for the office
itself.69 Criticism of the court's rulings and conduct in respectful
terms and through legitimate channels is not improper; in fact,
respectful criticism when warranted may even be an integral part
of the attorney's general duty to assist in improving the legal
system. 0 However, when an attorney accuses appellate court
judges of wilfully, wantonly, and corruptly making false state-
ments and findings in their opinions, he violates his professional
67. Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has highlighted these differences:
Intermediate appellate courts have functions very different from either trial
courts or courts of last resort. . . . Broad-gauge policy making is only rarely a
part of these courts' institutional concerns. Arguments addressed to these courts
are most effective when the advocate can persuade the courts that existing
precedent controls, or if it does not, that it need be nudged only a little to reach
his conclusion.
Arguments addressed to courts of last resort exercising discretionary review
are very different creatures because the function of these courts is to establish
overarching precedents and policy for every level of the judicial system below
their lofty perches. . . . The concern of these courts is not so much where the
law has been as where it should be going. ...
Hufstedler, The Art of Oral Argument, 18 U. MicH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 14 (Spring,
1974) (from an address delivered at the Henry M. Campbell Memorial Banquet, March
12, 1974).
68. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8, Ethical Consideration 8-4, and
Disciplinary Rule 8-102.
69. People v. Standidge, 333 Ill. 361, 366-67, 164 N.E. 844, 846 (1928).
70. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 8. See also In re Mason, 33 Ill.2d
53, 57, 210 N.E.2d 203, 205 (1965); People v. Standidge, 333 Ill. 361, 367-68, 164 N.E. 844,
846 (1928).
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responsibility.7 "Unjust criticism, insulting language and offen-
sive conduct. . . which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity can-
not be permitted."" Even after the legal matter has been decided
the attorney must still restrain himself from engaging in "insult-
ing language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts."73
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
Compensating for Attorney Error
The reviewing court has an overriding and primary responsi-
bility to compensate for attorney neglect in appeals. It is true,
of course, that an attorney who neglects the interest of his client
in a civil appellate matter subjects himself to the risk of a mal-
practice suit.74 However, such a suit is not a viable remedy. It
appears from the dearth of malpractice suits that either injured
clients are unaware of the availability of the remedy or, aware or
not, they are precluded by the particular circumstances of their
case from pursuing that cause of action. Moreover, as previously
noted, the client is not often in as favorable a position to detect
negligence of appellate counsel as he is when he participates in
the trial. Only the courts maintain the capacity in both civil and
criminal matters to vindicate client rights to adequate appellate
representation.
A reviewing court ordinarily becomes aware of patent breaches
of professional responsibility at some stage in the appellate pro-
cess. Once aware, the judges are bound whenever possible to pro-
tect the rights of the client and, in any event, to protect the public
from future cases of improper practice." This duty may involve
71. People v. Standidge, 333 Il. 361, 367-68, 164 N.E. 844, 846 (1928); State v. Grimes,
436 P.2d 40 (Okla. 1967).
72. People v. Metzen, 291 Ill. 55, 58, 125 N.E. 734, 738 (1920). See also In re Mason, 33
Ill.2d 53, 58, 210 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1965); In re Meeker, 76 N.M. 354, 414 P.2d 862 (1966);
In re Mitchell, 196 Ala. 430, 71 So. 467 (1916).
73. State Bar Comm'n ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 753, 131 P. 703, 707
(1912). See also State Bd. of Law Examiners v. Hart, 104 Minn. 88, 122, 116 N.W. 212,
218 (1908).
74. See Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 823 (1964).
75. In re Fisher, 15 Ill.2d 139, 154, 153 N.E.2d 832, 840 (1958).
[Vol. 25:264
APPELLATE ETHICS
the exercise of judicial discretion when such discretion is given
the courts through statute, court rules, or legal precedent. In
Illinois, Supreme Court Rules give reviewing courts broad dis-
cretionary powers which, when exercised, may prevent injustice
when counsel has violated procedural rules or otherwise neglected
his case. Included are powers to amend the pleadings and record,
to change parties, to draw inferences of fact, and to grant any
other relief the case may require. 6 The reviewing court may also,
in its discretion, waive the time period specified for both filing the
record, briefs, abstracts, and reply briefs and fulfilling other pro-
cedural duties when prejudice would not result."
There are numerous examples of how reviewing courts can exer-
cise their discretionary powers to compensate for attorney error.
Reinstating a criminal appeal is appropriate where the delay in
filing it is caused by the serious neglect of counsel alone, with no
chargeable complicity by the defendant." The reviewing court
may also either dismiss an appeal or affirm pro forma when ap-
pellant counsel has not substantially complied with the proce-
dural rules."9 In cases where attorneys fail to raise relevant issues
the court can raise them on its own motion to insure justice. On
its own, the court can question jurisdiction," search the record to
affirm,1 amend the caption of a complaint,8" and utilize grounds
and theories not raised by either party to decide the case." In
76. ILL.REV.STAT. ch. ll0A, §366 (1973). The following powers are granted.
[The powers to] give any judgment and make any order that ought to have been
given or made, and make any other and further orders and grant any relief,
including a remandment, a partial reversal, the order of a partial new trial, the
entry of a remittitur, or the issuance of execution, that the case may require.
77. See, e.g., Security Bank v. Pollard, 3 Ill.2d 153, 156-57, 119 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954);
O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 5 Ill.App.3d 870, 873, 284 N.E.2d 682, 684 (4th Dist. 1972).
78. People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill.2d 579, 328 N.E.2d 555 (1975).
79. Security Bank v. Pollard, 3 Ill.2d 153, 156-57, 119 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954).
80. Keen v. Davis, 108 Ill.App.2d 55, 63, 246 N.E.2d 467,471 (5th Dist. 1969). See also
Routt v. Newman, 157 Ill.App. 242,243, 97 N.E.2d 208 (1st Dist. 1910).
81. Voegele v. Kidd, 18 Ill.App.2d 400, 403, 152 N.E.2d 887, 889 (4th Dist. 1958).
82. People v. Sirinsky, 47 Ill.2d 183,187, 265 N.E.2d 505,507 (1970).
83. Reviewing courts are properly reluctant to decide cases on issues which the parties
have not raised, with the attendant risk of legal unpredictability. But there may be
occasions when the court acts sua sponte to avoid what the court perceives as an unjust
result. See, e.g., First Trust & Say. Bank v. Powers, 393 Ill. 97, 104, 65 N.E.2d 377, 380
(1946) ("if the question that an agreement is void as against public policy is not raised
by a party to the action it is not only proper but necessary that the court sua sponte
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addition, the court may employ judicial notice to supply matters
lacking in the record. 4 This list is not exhaustive, but illustrative
of some ways reviewing courts can compensate for inadequacies
of counsel and/or defects in the record.
Disciplining the Attorney
To save the client is not necessarily to forgive the attorney.5
The attorney is not ordinarily entitled to the benefit of the court's
exercise of discretion.A" Fortunately, only a small percentage of
cases involve acts of misconduct serious enough to warrant harsh
disciplinary sanctions.
Flagrant abuse of procedural rules by an appellate attorney,
through inaction or negligence, may result in a referral to a disci-
plinary commission." Failure to perfect a criminal appeal, among
interpose the defense."), Wohluter v. St. Charles Lumber & Fuel Co., 25 Ill.App.3d 812,
815, 323 N.E.2d 134, 136 (2d Dist. 1975) (court did not agree that the question of the
impairment of security under U.C.C. 3-606 was the dispositive issue, and sua sponte
decided that the impairment defense was not available to principals and co-makers);
DePhillips v. DePhillips, 63 Ill.App.2d 19, 24-25, 211 N.E.2d 147, 150 (1st Dist. 1965)
(legality of decree giving unwed father visitation rights); Lanteen Lab., Inc. v. Clark, 294
Ill.App. 81, 13 N.E.2d 678 (1st Dist. 1938) (contract against public policy).
See also Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9
N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S. 2d 193 (1961); Tate, Sua Sponte Consideration on
Appeal, 9 TRIAL JUDGES J. 68 (1970); VESTAL, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate
Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (1959).
84. See People ex rel. Am. Fed'n of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Walker,
61 1ll.2d 112, 332 N.E.2d 401 (1975) (the date a bill was presented to the Governor). See
also Hazdra Homes Inc. v. County of DuPage, 27 Ill.App.3d 685, 687, 326 N.E.2d 561, 563
(2d Dist. 1975); Ellis Realty v. Chapelski, 28 IlI.App.3d 1008, 1014, 329 N.E. 2d 370, 375
(1st Dist.1975); People v. Krall, 29 Ill.App.3d 86, 87-88, 329 N.E.2d 441, 442 (4th Dist.
1975). See also cases collected in Fins, Judicial Notice-The Illinois Anomaly! 7 JOHN
MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & Proc. 15 (1973).
85. This is not to say, however, that the attorney is to be penalized for his minor failures
when he has substantially performed, or for his exercise of judgment even when hindsight
reveals that the appeal strategy was poorly conceived.
86. The compensating role of the reviewing court which necessarily waives the rule that
a client is bound by the acts of his attorney, is designed to protect the client from unfair
prejudice and injustice. See, e.g., People v. Aliwoli, 60 Ill.2d 579, 328 N.E.2d 555 (1975).
87. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§751 et seq. (1973). Of course, the ultimate
responsibility for determining attorney guilt and imposing discipline remains with the
courts. In Illinois, the supreme court possesses this responsibility. In re Sherman, 60 Ill.2d
590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553, 555 (1975), citing In re Wyatt, 53 Ill.2d 44, 45, 289 N.E.2d 630,
631 (1972).
In 1973, the Illinois Supreme Court delegated the administration of disciplinary matters
to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The Commission may initiate
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other derelictions, has resulted in an indefinite suspension from
the practice of law.8" Suspension has also been imposed when an
attorney, among other acts of misconduct, failed to file an appel-
late brief."5 Failure to file an abstract followed by a failure to
request an extension of time to do so after court order, has re-
sulted in censure for neglect of duty and violation of the canons.,'
Finally, the filing of numerous unsubstantial petitions for review
of an immigration order has led to suspension from bar member-
ship plus the imposition of a fine in the First Circuit Court of
Appeals."
Where attorney incompetence falls short of flagrant miscon-
duct, the more common situation, less severe sanctions are war-
ranted. Unfortunately, the Illinois appellate courts are without
effective disciplinary powers in this area. Short of referral to an
inquiry board and subsequent supreme court action, the only
remedy for violation of rules in Illinois has been dismissal or pro
forma disposition of the case.2 When immaterial matters are in-
corporated in the appellate record, the court also has the power
to tax costs against a party irrespective of the outcome of the
action on complaint, by direction of the court administrator, or on its own initiative. If
there is evidence of unethical or unprofessional conduct, the complaint is channelled to
an inquiry board. The board may vote a complaint against an attorney, after which it is
filed with the Administrator of the Commission. The Administrator prepares the com-
plaint for proceedings before a hearing board. If the hearing board makes a recommenda-
tion to discipline the attorney, such action is reviewed by a review board. The review board
has a certain degree of independent responsibility not unlike an appellate court, and, once
it affirms the hearing board recommendation, it files the recommendation with the Illinois
Supreme Court. The court acts as a final reviewing body. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, §§751
et seq. (1973). The Commission can recommend disbarment, suspension, or censure. See
60 ILL. B. J. 528-33 (1971-72).
88. People v. Burns, 164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968).
89. Florida Bar v. King, 242 So.2d 705 (Fla. 1971).
90. State v. Thompson, 208 N.W.2d 926 (Iowa 1973).
91. In re Bithoney 486 F.2d 319, 325 (1st Cir. 1973).
92. The Illinois appellate courts, however, possess contempt power. "The courts are
vested with an inherent power to punish for contempt as an essential incident to the
maintenance of their authority in the administration and execution of their judicial pow-
ers .... " (citation omitted). Stevens v. County of Lake, 24 Ill.App.3d 51, 59, 320 N.E.2d
263, 270 (2d Dist. 1974). This power, though, is seldom exercised by appellate courts, and
is not a viable disciplinary tool. An attorney's conduct may breach standards of profes-
sional responsibility, yet still fall short of legal contempt of court. Cf. Taylor v. Hayes,
418 U.S. 488 (1974). In marked contrast to trial courts, appellate incompetence or miscon-
duct manifests itself in statements made in motions, affidavits, and briefs, rather than in
the presence of the court.
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appeal."3 However, these exercises of court power, including the
power to strike the pending pleadings, punish the litigant rather
than the attorney. Understandably, reviewing courts in Illinois
are reluctant to enforce compliance with the rules using these
methods.
The federal appellate court system provides some guidance in
the area of effective disciplinary procedures. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied Federal
Procedural Rule 46(c)' to impose monetary fines ranging from
$100 to $500 upon lawyers who have failed to prosecute a criminal
appeal with due diligence.95 Similarly, the same court has also
used Rule 46(c) to levy a fine on an attorney for wilful neglect of
duty to the court when he failed to expedite an appeal as
directed and to appear before the court as ordered to offer an
explanation." In another Ninth Circuit decision, the court or-
dered that an attorney, pursuant to his offer, repay defendant's
parents $800 of his $1,000 collected fee for failing to prosecute
defendant's criminal appeal with due diligence."
It is suggested that a direct authorization of power similar to
Federal Rule 46(c) be issued Illinois reviewing courts to enforce
performance by the appellate lawyer substantially above mini-
mum standards of professional competence. As noted, federal
circuit courts of appeal have applied Rule 46(c) to take "appro-
priate disciplinary action. . . for conduct unbecoming a member
93. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, §330 (1973).
94. FED. R. Ap. P. 46(c). The rule provides inter alia:
Disciplinary Power of the Court Over Attorneys. A court of appeals may, after
reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and after
hearing, if requested, take any appropriate action against any attorney who
practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or for failure to
comply with these rules or any rule of the court (emphasis added).
95. United States v. Pearson, 476 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carrion,
475 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rivera, 473 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir. 1972).
96. United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 1130 (9th Cir. 1970). In Smith the attorney was
fined $750 for neglect of duty to his client, $750 for contempt resulting from his neglect of
duty to the court, and $500 for contempt and for his failure to appear in response to a
court order. For a case in which an even harsher penalty was assigned, see People v. Burns,
164 Colo. 490, 435 P.2d 897 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of Colorado indefinitely
suspended an attorney from practice for his failure to perfect an appeal in a criminal case,
coupled with other derelictions.
97. In re Silver, 508 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1975).
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or for failure to comply with these rules or any rule of the court." 8
Its purpose is "to make explicit the power of a court of appeals
to impose sanctions less serious than suspension or disbarment
for the breach of rules."99 No similarly explicit rule is found in
Illinois.' °° Therefore, an explicit rule patterned after Federal Rule
46(c) would appear to be a fair and effective tool which would
suffice in most instances to discourage uninformed and careless
practices in violation of specific court rules.
A rule patterned after Rule 46 could also apply where there is
technical compliance with procedural rules, but inadequate prep-
aration and argument of the case. However, before this new sanc-
tion could be so imposed, the standards of appellate advocacy
must more specifically than before address the differences be-
tween trial and appellate advocacy. The appellate lawyer is enti-
tled to clear notice of the standards he is expected to meet before
being subjected to sanctions of any kind.
CONCLUSION
Our principal system of adjudication is the adversary
system. In that system, the truth, in the sense of relevant
facts accurately determined, is vitally important for the
rational administration of justice. Too often our adversary
techniques conceal or distort the truth rather than pro-
mote its discovery. The legal profession should consider
and explore appropriate modifications of adversary proce-
dures for the purpose of better determining the truth, and
should formulate ethical prescriptions embracing a higher
professional duty to seek the truth.''
The most pressing and serious problems of ethics exist at the
trial level. But considerable ethical problems also exist regarding
98. FED. R. APP. P. 46(c).
99. Id. Notes on Rule 46 of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules (CCH ed. 1968).
100. Whether Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), ILL.REV.STAT. ch. 110A,
§366(a)(5)(1973), granting power to the reviewing court to "make any order ... that the
case may require," would permit sanctions similar to those under Federal Rule 46(c) has
been considered. However, it appears to the author that this rule was not intended to
provide powers beyond the correction of errors on appeal.
101. Report of the American Assembly on Law in a Changing Society II, published in
95 S.Ct. No. 18, p. 12 (emphasis added).
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the conduct and practice of lawyers on appeal. It should be recog-
nized that, in a sense, the ethical considerations in appellate
actions require even greater court attention because the client is
less able than in trial court actions to discover deficiencies in
representation and therefore less able to charge them when they
do in fact occur. However, the main concern of this Article is not
the relatively few instances of exceptional misconduct in the
reviewing courts that have resulted in disciplinary action or in
civil malpractice suits. Rather, the principal area of concern is
with conduct which satisfies minimum standards, but still fails
to satisfy standards of representation which the court system and
the public have a right to expect. If this expectation cannot be
achieved, there is an obvious danger of loss of respect by the
public for courts and lawyers.
Judges will be doing a disservice to the judicial system if they
feel no obligation to impose higher than minimum standards
upon attorneys. The great majority of lawyers practicing before
reviewing courts recognize and obey the call of conscience. How-
ever, for those few attorneys who do not perform substantially
above minimum standards, tools are needed to both enforce com-
pliance with the procedural rules and generally improve the qual-
ity of appellate representation. Therefore, as a function of their
obligation to further the objectives of law and justice, reviewing
courts should lead the way to demand and achieve ethical con-
duct in the appellate process. First, the professional conduct ex-
pected from the appellate lawyers should be more clearly deline-
ated. Second, courts must be given discretion to impose a greater
variety of sanctions upon incompetent attorneys. Then, if there
are ethical deficiencies short of those which require disciplinary
charges, judges will have the opportunity to invoke appropriate
procedure, which may include cautionary advice or monetary
fines. In more aggravated cases, judges may have the clear obliga-
tion to refer the matter to the appropriate disciplinary body for
investigation and possible action. The task is not a pleasing one
for judges or for lawyers. However, it is a necessary one if public
respect for the courts is to be encouraged and maintained.
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